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achievement of children of immigrants compared with the educational achievement of 
native children in their origin countries 
 
J. Dronkers & M. de Heus 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to empirically test the negative selectivity hypothesis of 
Europe’s guest-worker immigration. We do this by comparing the educational 
achievement of children of guest-worker immigrants in various European countries to 
the educational achievement of the pupils in their origin countries, using the PISA 
2006 data. Our analysis supports the thesis that guest-workers in Europe have been 
negatively selected from their native population. The average science score of 
children of guest-workers is substantially lower than the science score of comparable 
native pupils in their origin countries. The Islamic background of the Turkish guest-
workers is not related to the negative selectivity of guest-workers in Europe. 
However, a large gap between the science performance of immigrants and the native 
population in their home countries is also observed for first generation Austrian and 
French immigrant pupils and for second generation German pupils. A possible 
explanation is that non-guest-worker immigrants in Europe also have more difficulties 
in establishing themselves in their new home countries as compared to immigrants in 
the traditional immigration countries (e.g. the USA, Australia, and Canada).  
 
Keywords: immigration; guest-workers; selectivity of immigration; educational 
performance 
 
Introduction 
PISA 2003 and 2006 data have revealed that Turkish immigrant pupils perform 
significantly less than immigrant pupils from other countries of origin. These lower 
scores of Turkish immigrant pupils cannot be fully explained by their individual 
background characteristics (e.g. parental education, parental occupational status, 
resources available in their homes, and language proficiency) or by economic or 
educational system characteristics of the countries they have migrated to (Levels and  
Dronkers, 2008; de Heus, Dronkers, and Levels, 2008).  
 An important explanation that has been raised to explain the (remaining) 
educational disadvantage of Turkish immigrant pupils is the negative selectivity of 
‘guest-worker migration’. Guest-worker programs were implemented in the 1950s as 
the need for workers in low skilled jobs could no longer be filled by natives. 
Countries such as Germany, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland recruited inexpensive 
and unskilled laborers from the poorest and most backward rural regions of Turkey, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia (Hunn, 2005).  
 No study so far has empirically tested the influence of immigrants’ guest-
worker origins on their educational performance. Therefore, this paper aims to 
establish whether the educational performance of children from origin groups that 
have a guest-worker past is lower than the educational performance of native pupils in 
their countries of origin. Such a lower educational performance would be a strong 
indicator of the negative selectivity of guest-worker programs. In order to rule out the 
possibility that all immigrant groups are equally negatively selected, the discrepancy 
between the educational performance of immigrant children from non-guest-worker 
origins and the educational performance of native pupils in their origin countries will 
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also be analyzed. Comparing the educational performance of immigrant children to 
the performance of pupils in their origin countries provides a more reliable estimation 
of selective migration than comparing the educational level of the migrating parents to 
the educational level of the native parents in their origin countries.  
 In order to rule out the possibility that other characteristics of immigrants’ 
countries of origin and destination can explain the educational disadvantage of certain 
origin groups, we connect to previous research by taking into account religious, 
economic, and political indicators of countries of origin and educational system 
features of countries immigrants have migrated to.  
  
Theories and empirical evidence on immigrant selectivity1 
Immigrants are selected on various characteristics such as education, occupation, 
skills, age, ambition, and gender. The (self-)selection process of all these 
characteristics occurs on several complex and interrelated levels. First, since only 
some people want to migrate and have the resources to do so, the choice to emigrate is 
in itself a selective one. Second, countries such as the former Soviet Union have 
historically had restrictive exit policies that only allowed a select group of individuals 
to emigrate. Countries such as Australia and New Zealand have adopted a 
qualification system to encourage the selection of highly skilled immigrants 
(Winkelmann, 2001; Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp, 2008). In other words, 
countries’ immigration policies influence the composition of their immigrant 
compositions. Third, political and economic conditions in the sending country 
influence the nature of the migrant flows (Massey, 1999; Rumbaut, 1997). Fourth, the 
demand for certain types of workers (for instance, unskilled workers or guest-
workers) affects the selectivity of economic immigrants from different countries 
(Massey, 1999). And finally, the historical relationship between receiving country and 
sending country (for instance Portugal and Brazil) guides immigrant selection.  
 Since the 18th century,2 scholars have disagreed considerably on how 
immigrants compare to those who are left behind. Immigration might be selective, but 
what does this selection look like? Some researchers argue that all immigrants, 
whether legal or illegal, represent a positively selected group from the home country 
because they are more ambitious and willing to work or have higher levels of 
education than their counterparts who stayed behind (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; 
Treiman et al. 1986). Massey (1987, 1999) has contended that although migrants tend 
to be positively selected initially, they become less selected as successive waves 
migrate from a particular country. Over time, the network of immigrants from a 
particular origin country expands, and as migration driven by social networks 
continues, migration for the next wave becomes less costly, and persons who are 
relatively low educated or skilled begin to migrate. 
Other scholars have underscored the importance of migration motives related 
to the situation of the origin countries and destination: if migrants leave because of 
“plus factors” (or pull factors) in the destination country, they will be positively 
selected. If they are responding to “minus factors” (or push factors) in the sending 
society, they will be negatively selected (Lee, 1966). Related to this, Borjas (1987, 
1991) has argued that the level of positive or negative selection to the USA is related 
to the level of income distribution in the sending countries as compared to the income 
distribution in the USA. However, according to economists studying selective 
migration, political refugees who respond to push factors may not be as negatively 
selected as others. This would be the case because according to those economists, 
only economic migrants are (self-)selected (Chiswick, 2000). The analysis of the 
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PISA 2003 data by Levels et al. (2009) of the educational performance of children of 
immigrants from various origins and with diverse destinations confirms the 
importance of the migration motives. Immigrant children from politically unstable 
origin countries perform, ceteris paribus, less well at school, while immigrant 
children from countries with a lower level of economic development perform 
relatively well in school. 
Furthermore, migration obstacles are argued to be an important factor: 
immigrants who face the greatest barriers in migrating will be the most positively 
selected (Schultz, 1984). An example of this is the distance (and therefore financial 
burden) between the origin country and the preferred destination country.  
 In sum, the literature devoted to the selectivity of the migration process 
suggests that the degree to which migrants differ from non-migrants in their 
homelands varies by origin countries. Even if immigrants are all positively selected, 
there may be substantial variability in the level of selectivity by origin country, such 
that immigrants from some countries are more positively selected than others  
As noted above, the outcome of these (self-)selection processes in migration 
has not been studied in Europe. Although selective migration to and within Europe 
has been suggested (for instance in relation to guest-worker programs), the existing 
empirical studies relate only to migration to the USA. This study aims to empirically 
compare the educational achievement of children from immigrant groups that were 
recruited as guest-workers (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia) 
with those pupils who have remained in their origin countries. The discrepancy 
between the educational performance of both groups of pupils can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the selectivity of guest-worker immigrants, especially if this discrepancy 
is larger than the difference in educational performance between non-guest-worker 
immigrants and the natives in their origin countries. 
 
Selective migration of guest-worker immigrants 
Guest-worker programs got implemented in the 1950s as the need for workers in low 
skilled jobs could no longer be filled by natives. As an example, the German 
government signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955, Greece in 
1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964 and Yugoslavia in 1968, which allowed 
guest-workers from these origin countries to enter Germany easily. Other European 
states such as Belgium and later Austria and Switzerland followed the German 
example. These agreements allowed the recruitment of guest-workers from these 
countries who were supposed to work in industrial sector jobs that required few 
qualifications. Guest-workers from Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Greece, 
mostly male, were allowed to work in Germany for a period of one or two years 
before returning to their home country in order to make room for other migrants. 
Many of these migrant workers, not being satisfied by the accommodations of the 
institutions, were permitted to re-unite with their existing families. In the event, many 
migrants decided not to return to their origin countries (see the classical work on the 
Turkish guest-workers in West-Germany of Abadan-Unat, 1976). 
This implementation of the so called guest-worker programs might have 
caused a negative selection of Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish and Yugoslavian 
citizens into unskilled labour in Europe. The selection of these guest-workers deviated 
from other immigrants from most other regions. In order to attract relatively 
inexpensive and unskilled labour for the richer West-European countries, guest-
workers were systematically recruited from the poorest and most backward rural 
regions of Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia (Hunn, 2005). 
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The socio-economic background of these workers was relatively low compared to the 
rest of the population of their origin countries. The connection between the guest-
worker immigrants in Europe and the poorest and most backward regions remained 
intact after the abolishment of guest-worker programs, by family-reunification and 
marriages between children of guest-workers and their relatives from these poorest 
and most backward regions. Based on this summary, the following hypotheses can be 
derived: 1. Children of guest-worker immigrants in European countries have lower 
science scores than native pupils in their origin countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia); 2. The difference in science scores between 
children of guest-worker immigrants and native children in their countries of origin is 
larger than the difference in science scores between children of non-guest-worker 
immigrants and the native children in their countries of origin.  
If guest-workers are only characterized by poor socio-economic backgrounds, 
one would expect that controlling for differences in parental socio-economic 
background would substantially diminish the differences between the lower science 
score of children of guest-worker immigrants and the score of the pupils in their 
origin countries. If this would be the case, the difference between immigrants with 
guest-worker origins and their native population would also come closer to the 
difference between immigrants without guest-worker origins and their native 
population. However, due to the large cultural and economic distance between the 
poor origin regions and the prosperous destination countries and the continuing family 
and marriage links with these regions, controlling for differences in parental socio-
economic background might not diminish all differences between the lower science 
score of children of guest-workers immigrants and the higher score of the pupils in 
their origin countries. Therefore we assume that 3. Children of guest-worker 
immigrants have lower science scores than the average pupils in their origin 
countries, even after controlling for parental socio-economic background 
characteristics of parents in origin and destination countries. 4. Children of guest-
worker immigrants differ more in science performance from the pupils in their origin 
countries than children of non-guest-worker immigrants, even after controlling for 
parental socio-economic background characteristics of all immigrants, and the 
macro-characteristics of their origin and destination countries.  
   
Selective migration of guest-worker immigrants versus Islamic religion 
Although their parents’ guest-worker past is a plausible explanation for the relatively 
low educational performance of Turkish immigrant pupils, their Islamic background  
might be an alternative explanation. Although individual religion is only rarely taken 
into account in comparable analyses of immigrant integration, Fleischmann & 
Dronkers (2008) have shown that it is an important predictor of socio-economic 
outcomes. Using the European Social Survey data, they present negative effects of the 
Islamic religion in all EU destination countries, even after controlling for human 
capital measures. They for instance show that Muslim men have significantly higher 
unemployment rates than non-Muslim men, they tend to have lower returns of 
education on labour market participation, a lower occupational status, and less 
chances of employment in the non-routine and non-manual sector. Muslim women are 
primarily affected in terms of educational attainment and their chances of 
participation on the labour market. Moreover, de Heus and Dronkers (2008) have 
found a significant negative effect of originating from a Muslim origin country on the 
educational performance of immigrant pupils, even after controlling for a wide range 
of micro- and macro-characteristics.  
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 Three important processes might account for this negative Islam-effect. 
Firstly, it is possible that Muslims have a different religious habitus which decreases 
their chances to succeed in education or on the labour market. If for instance one of 
their religious values (honour) partly contradicts one of the conditions of success of 
modern capitalism (productivity), their success might be hampered. A second 
explanation might be discrimination against Muslims, be it direct or indirect, on the 
labour markets of the EU countries. Andre, Dronkers, and Fleischmann (2008) have 
shown that Islamic immigrants and immigrants who adhere to a non-Latin-Christian 
religion feel more discriminated than immigrants from non-religious backgrounds in 
the EU countries. A third explanation is the deviant selectivity of the guest-workers 
who were imported from three Islamic countries (Morocco, Algiers, Turkey).  
Resulting from the above findings and line of reasoning, we formulate our 
fifth hypothesis: the difference in science scores between Turkish immigrant pupils 
and the native pupils in Turkey is larger than the difference in science scores between 
the children of Christian guest-worker immigrants and the native pupils from their 
Christian origin countries Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia.  
 
Macro-characteristics of countries of origin and destination 
In order to account for the possibility that the low educational performances of 
Turkish immigrant pupils are caused by other factors than their guest-worker or 
Islamic origin, macro-characteristics of the countries of origin and destination are 
taken into account as control variables.  
 
Economic development and political stability of origin countries 
A first characteristic of origin countries that is likely to influence immigrant 
children’s educational performance is origin countries’ level of political stability. 
A lower mathematic performance of children originating from politically unstable 
countries was found by Levels et al. (2008) using PISA 2003 data. Several 
explanations support this finding. First, politically motivated migrants are not so much 
attracted by the expected better (economic) condition in their destination countries, 
but are more or less pushed away by threats experienced in their origin countries 
(Chiswick, 1999). Depending on the degree of political instability, immigrants from 
less stable political countries are often traumatized by the migration process. Whereas 
first-generation immigrant children might have experienced the trauma themselves, 
second-generation immigrants are influenced by it through their family members. 
Second, immigrants from politically instable countries might perceive their stay in 
their new destination country as only temporary. This might reduce their efforts to 
invest in (their children’s) schooling and diplomas that may not pay off after returning 
to their origin country. Third, natives in countries that receive a lot of political 
refugees tend to be relatively concerned about immigration’s impact on social issues 
such as crime (Bauer et al., 2000). Although de facto this refers to a destination effect, 
it nevertheless implies a discriminative attitude towards political refugees that might 
translate into lower educational achievements of children originating from these 
countries.  
 Moreover, van Tubergen et al. (2004) have argued that migrants originating 
from economically developed countries generally have more human capital skills than 
migrants from developing countries. Since the education systems of economically 
developed countries transfer skills and diplomas that are also of value in immigrants’ 
new economically developed destination countries, immigrants from economically 
more developed countries are likely to have more favourable background 
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characteristics than immigrants from less economically developed countries. This 
expected positive effect of origin countries’ level of economic development has not 
been detected by Levels et al. (2008) using PISA 2003 data, but it has been identified 
by de Heus and Dronkers (2008) using PISA 2006 data. This differential result might 
be explained by the fact that Levels et al. (2008) used a more restricted measurement 
of economic development (GDP per capita) than de Heus and Dronkers (2008) (the 
Human Development Index).  
 Moreover, since the average educational performance of natives also varies 
across immigrant children’s origin countries, we take into account this average 
performance of the natives as a control variable. This approach has been suggested by 
van Tubergen et al. (2004) since it accounts for the fact that origin countries differ in 
the educational quality they offer.  
 
The educational system of the destination countries 
Next to the above described characteristics of immigrant children’s origin countries, 
the quality of the educational system of immigrant children’s destination countries is 
likely to affect their educational performance. We control for this educational quality 
by taking into account the average science scores of the natives of their destination 
countries. This average reflects the quality of that educational system and the 
standards for educational performance in their destination countries. Furthermore, 
since de Heus et al. (2008) using the same PISA 2006 data found effects of the degree 
of differentiation and teacher shortage on the educational performance of immigrants, 
we take those two measures into account as well.   
 Differentiation of the education system refers to the extent to which pupils of 
the same age are divided into separate types of education. Whereas highly stratified 
systems track pupils into different types of secondary education at a relatively young 
age, systems that are less differentiated postpone that decision until a later age. In 
addition to this institutional differentiation, pupils can also be grouped according to 
ability. The central argument behind institutional tracking or types of ability grouping 
is that homogeneous learning environments permit a focused curriculum and paced 
instruction, which increases the average performance of all students (Hanushek and 
Wössmann, 2006). This expected higher average performance has however been 
argued to come at a cost: highly differentiated systems seem to hinder the educational 
performance of lower class children. The rationale behind this is that educational 
choices made at a relatively early age are more heavily influenced by parental 
background than by children’s actual achievements (Mare, 1981; Shavit and 
Blossfeld, 1993), leading to an overrepresentation of lower class pupils among the 
lower educational tracks. Rational choice models have explained this by pointing to a 
mechanism called ‘relative risk aversion’ (see e.g. Breen and Yaish, 2006). The 
central idea of relative risk aversion is that the major educational goal of young 
people (and their families) is to reach an educational level that allows them to attain a 
class position that is at least as good as that of their parents, leading to less ambitious 
choices among lower class pupils. These pupils are therefore overrepresented in 
schools and tracks in which the disciplinary climate and the teaching conditions are 
less favourable and in which the curriculum is less ambitious (Dupriez, Dumay, and 
Vause, 2008). Pfeffer (2008) has recently underscored the importance of parents’ 
strategic knowledge of the education system as a crucial resource that translates into 
different educational choices. Parents’ strategic knowledge is especially important in 
highly stratified systems. Overall, higher educated parents will be better aware of the 
different educational options and will therefore be better able to navigate their 
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children successfully through the educational labyrinth. If this line of reasoning is 
applied to the educational position of immigrant children, their educational 
performance is likely to be lower in highly differentiated educational systems. After 
all, as a result of an overall lower level of parental resources and specific features 
related to their immigrant background (a lower command of the host country’s 
language and a different cultural background), they are more likely to be selected into 
lower educational tracks. Moreover, immigrant children’s parents will generally have 
less ‘know-how requirements’ regarding the functioning of the host country’s 
educational system, which is especially detrimental in highly differentiated systems. 
We therefore control for the degree of differentiation of educational systems in the 
destination countries. Using PISA 2006 data, de Heus et al. (2008) have shown that 
the average performance of immigrant children is lower in countries that have a 
highly differentiated educational system (e.g. Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands).  
 Despite the limited support for a positive influence of school resources on 
educational achievement, the picture might look differently for immigrant children.  
Next to having a socioeconomic disadvantage to natives, immigrant children’s 
educational performance is also hindered by specific immigrant characteristics. 
Immigrant parents’ limited knowledge of the education system and their often 
restricted language skills hinder their possibilities to help their children with their 
homework or prepare them for tests. Due to a lack of support provided by immigrant 
children’s parents, the educational achievement of immigrant children is expected to 
depend more on the resources provided by their educational systems. We therefore 
control for the quality of resources of a destination country’s educational system (in 
this case, the shortage of teachers). In line with expectations, de Heus et al. (2008) 
have shown that immigrant pupils have a lower average performance in countries that 
have high degrees of teacher shortage.  
 
Data and variables 
Since 2000, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has tri-annually conducted large scale tests among 15-year-olds living in its member 
states and partner states in order to assess pupils’ mathematical, reading, and scientific 
literacy. In doing so, the OECD has aimed to find out the extent to which pupils near 
the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills 
essential for full participation in society. Alongside information on pupils’ educational 
performance, PISA also provides information on their individual characteristics (e.g. 
on parental education and careers, resources that are available in the child’s home, and 
the birth countries of both the parents and the student).  
The data we use (PISA 2006) do not allow to test other hypotheses related to 
the lower educational achievements of immigrants in Europe, such as discrimination 
or religion, because indicators for discrimination or religion (even the most indirect) 
are not part of the PISA survey. 
 
Science score as dependent variable 
The dependent variable of this study is scientific literacy, which was the main focus of 
the PISA 2006 wave.3 In order to be able to cover as many facets of the scientific field 
as possible (in general, the scientific field should be regarded as a combination of the 
disciplines of Biology, Physics, Chemistry, and Geography, covering topics such as 
health, natural resources, and environment), a test with a total assessment time of 390 
minutes was developed. However, since it would not be sensible to administer a test 
of more than 6 hours to an individual pupil, 13 largely comparable item clusters (also 
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called booklets) with a duration of 2 hours each were derived from the core test. 
These booklets were allocated to individual students according to a random selection 
process. Each participating student spent two hours carrying out pencil-and-paper 
tasks, of which approximately 54 per cent of the testing time was devoted to science, 
31 per cent to mathematics, and 15 per cent to reading. The booklets contained tasks 
requiring students to construct their own answers as well as multiple-choice questions. 
However, since two booklets can never have exactly the same average difficulty, Item 
Response Modelling was used to establish comparable science results across students. 
Item Response Modelling involves the construction of several plausible science 
values for each student. So, instead of obtaining just one score to indicate each 
student’s science ability, a range of 5 possible science score values per student was 
estimated. Since the scale of these five plausible science values has a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.987, the average of these 5 values is an unbiased estimation of a student’s 
overall science performance, and will be used as the dependent variable of this study.  
 
Origin country and destination country 
Specific information on the country of birth of both the parents and the student is 
necessary to be able to determine a pupil’s origin country. Since the OECD allows 
participating countries to propose their own birth country categories, some countries 
have allowed more detail than others. Therefore, although not less than 57 countries 
participated in the 2006 PISA wave, only data from the following 11 European 
countries are suited to test the hypotheses: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland.4 
In order to determine pupils’ origin country, several decision rules have been 
used based upon their own birth country and the birth countries of both of their 
parents. Next to the pupil’s origin country, we identified his/her immigrant status. 
Students of whom at least one of the parents was born in a country different from the 
destination country were identified as immigrants. Given the available countries of 
origin of the immigrant pupils in these 11 European destination countries, we can only 
take into account immigrant children originating from 17 countries of origin: Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Rumania, Russia, Serbia Montenegro, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Only 
these countries of origin participated in PISA 2006 and thus the sciences scores of the 
natives in these countries of origin are available (see tables in appendix). 
 Unfortunately, we cannot perform comparable analyses for Moroccans, 
Pakistani or Indians, because these countries did not participate in PISA. 
Consequently, we do not have the scores of the native pupils in these countries. 
It is important to keep in mind that we only have information on country of 
birth, and not on the more subjective memberships of ethnic, religious or cultural 
groups. If an immigrant child was born in Germany and then moved to another 
country, he or she will be measured as a German immigrant. As soon as these 
movements between European countries during the life course of both non-European 
and European immigrants becomes less exceptional, the use of the country of birth as 
an indicator of one’s ethnic, religious or cultural group becomes less reliable. 
The two tables in the appendix present the real number of immigrants in the 
various destination countries (de Heus & Dronkers, 2008) and their score on the 
science test.  
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Parental background measures 
Parental educational level is measured according to the ISCED scale 
(UNESCO, 2006) and ranges from 0 to 6. We use the ISCED level of the most 
educated parent.  
Parental occupational status is measured according to the ISEI scale 
(Ganzeboom, de Graaf, Treiman, and de Leeuw, 1992), which ranges from 16 to 90. 
We use the ISEI score of the parent with the highest occupational status. 
PISA index of educational resources at home. This scale is based on the 
availability of the following items in the students’ home: a desk to study at; a quiet 
place to study; a computer they can use for school work; educational software; their 
own calculator; books to help with their school work; and a dictionary. Higher values 
refer to more educational resources available at home.  
PISA index of cultural possessions at home was derived from students’ reports 
on the availability of the following items in their homes: classic literature (examples 
were given), books of poetry and works of art (examples were given). Higher values 
refer to higher levels of cultural possessions. 
 
Generation 
Immigrant students were either classified as first or second generation immigrants. 
The second generation are those students of whom at least one of the parents was 
born abroad and who were born in the current destination country themselves. The 
first generation was born in their origin country, just as at least one of the parents. 
Although it is tempting to interpret the first generation as recently arrived immigrants 
(between 1991 and 20015) and the second generation as immigrants who have 
migrated since the early 1960s,6 one can also reasonably argue that the two 
generations reflect different conditions of immigration (guest-worker program versus 
restricted entrance; guest-worker program versus EU membership with free 
movement for Italy, Portugal and Spain; guest-worker programs versus family-
reunion-migration). These different meanings of immigrant generation should be 
remembered while interpreting our results.  
 
Macro characteristics of origin and destination countries 
In order to take into account guest-worker migration, we have created a dummy that 
identifies whether immigrant pupils originate from origin countries that participated in 
guest-worker programmes (Italy, Spain, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and 
Portugal; 1) or not (Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Poland, Rumania, 
Russia, Sweden, and Switzerland; reference category).  
The average science score of the native pupils in the origin countries are the 
reference line to establish the differences between children of immigrants and the 
pupils in their counties of origin7.  
Origin countries’ level of political stability is measured by the Kaufmann’s 
indicator. Ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 (standardized scores), it assesses the probability 
that an origin country’s government in function will be overthrown in the near future 
by unconstitutional or violent means (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006). 
Higher scores refer to less chance of violence and therefore higher levels of political 
stability.  
An origin country’s level of economic development was measured by its 
Human Development Index (HDI). Whereas a country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita merely refers to a country’s economic development level in taking 
into account the total amount of final goods and services (in US dollars) that are 
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produced by a country in a year (CIA World Factbook, 2008), the HDI provides a 
broader picture of a county’s human development level. Ranging from 0 to 1, the 
Human Development Index (2007/2008) combines information on countries’ life 
expectancies, adult literacy rates, gross enrolment ratios in primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education, and GDPs in order to measure countries’ levels of human 
development.  
At the destination level, the average science score of the native pupils in the 
destination countries should be regarded as an indication of the average quality of the 
education in the destination countries. 
Differentiation of destination countries’ educational systems is taken into 
account as a dummy variable. We define Austria, Switzerland, Germany, and 
Liechtenstein as highly differentiated systems (1), and Portugal, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Latvia, and Norway as moderately/hardly differentiated 
systems (0; reference category). This categorization is based on descriptions of 
national experts (Schneider, 2008; Shavit and Müller, 1998; UNESCO, 2007).  
The degree of teacher shortage is an index provided by PISA (IRT scaling) 
that indicates the extent to which extent instruction is hindered by the following 
factors: a lack of qualified science teachers, a lack of qualified mathematics teachers, 
a lack of qualified language teachers, and a lack of qualified teachers of other 
subjects. Again, the index is based on answers provided by principals. Positive values 
refer to higher teacher shortages.  
 
Dropout from school before the age of 15. 
PISA measures the science performance of 15-year-olds attending secondary 
education in the participating countries. Although compulsory school age in all 
participating PISA countries is 15 or higher, legal norms may not reflect the social 
reality. This discrepancy between the legal obligation to attend school and the reality 
of regularly attending school will be large in Brazil and Turkey, and to a smaller 
extent also in Croatia, Romania, Russia, and Serbia/Montenegro (OECD, 2007). This 
implies that the ‘real’ science score of all 15-year-olds in these origin countries will 
be lower than measured by the scores of the pupils participating in PISA. This will be 
especially the case for pupils living in the rural areas of these countries: the measured 
scores of the pupil living in the rural areas might be an overestimation of the real 
score. The weighting by PISA will not have solved this dropout problem fully in these 
countries. This dropout from school before the age of 15 should also be remembered 
while interpreting our results.  
 
Dropout from the PISA survey 
Given the political and social importance of the PISA measurement in a number of 
countries (notable Germany), one can imagine that schools hinder their weakest pupils 
from participating in the PISA survey, even if they know that their results will never 
be published at the individual recognizable school-level. In particular, first generation 
immigrants who have arrived more recently will have a higher probability of not 
participating in the PISA survey, with the argument that they do not master the test 
sufficiently. This is, given the language-rich way PISA measures science literacy, a 
plausible reasoning. But this will lead to upward biased science scores of the first 
generation immigrants, because only the successful or the early arrivers will have 
participated in the PISA survey. This argument that pupils would be excluded from 
the PISA survey is less reasonable for the second generation immigrants, and thus 
they will more often participate in the PISA survey. As a consequence, the science 
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score of the second generation will be closer to their real score, while that of the first 
generation can be overestimated. 
 The same mechanism of exclusion can be expected in relation to the origin 
country. Pupils from EU countries have a lower probability of being excluded than 
pupils from non-EU countries. As a consequence, the observed score of pupils from 
non-EU countries is an overestimation of the lower ‘real’ science score of all 
immigrant pupils from non-EU countries, while the science score of the pupils from 
EU-countries will be closer to their real score. 
This differential exclusion of less successful pupils should be remembered 
while interpreting our results. However, it is unreasonable to assume that countries of 
test will differ strongly in applying this differential exclusion of less successful pupils. 
Moreover, it is highly implausible that Germany or the Netherlands (with the highest 
science scores, see table 1) have the strongest differential exclusion of less successful 
pupils in comparison, while Romania and Turkey (the lowest science score in Europe) 
hardly excluded unsuccessful pupils at all.  
 
Results 
Table 1 does not clearly support the hypothesis that the children from quest-worker 
immigrants have the largest negative science score as compared with the scores of the 
native pupils in their origin countries. The negative difference with the score of the 
native pupils in their origin country is largest for Italian second generation pupils (-
63), Austrian first generation pupils (-59), French first generation immigrant pupils (-
58), Italian first generation pupils (-57) and German second generation pupils (-54). 
Large differences between the science scores of immigrant pupils and the native 
population in their country of origin are thus found among immigrants from countries 
that never participated in guest-workers programs: Austria, France, and Germany. An 
ad-hoc but implausible explanation of this unexpected result might be that the 
majority of the immigrant pupils from Austria, France and Germany are children from 
guest-worker immigrants, who are born in Austria, France or Germany, but who 
moved to another European countries later on, and thus are coded as immigrant 
children from Austria, France or Germany. Although this “measurement error by the 
use of country of birth” might explain low scores in some cases, it is implausible that 
a majority of the 52 Austrian, 430 French, and 570 German immigrant pupils belongs 
to this group of “measurement error by the use of country of birth in stead of 
subjective ethnic group.”  
 The negative differences between science scores relative to the scores of the 
native pupils in their origin country are smaller for most origin countries of the guest-
workers: Croatia (-15; -10), Portugal (-27; -3), Serbia Montenegro (-27, -5), Spain (-
17; +27), and Turkey (-6, -9). Italy is a clear outlier among the guest-worker 
countries. A possible explanation for the very low science scores of the Italian 
immigrant pupils might be that the majority of these Italian immigrants came from the 
southern part of Italy where the average PISA scores are much lower than the scores 
of pupils in the northern parts of Italy (even after controlling for socio-economic 
background). The pupils from some of the northern, richer Italians regions, have 
average scores between 520 and 540 on the science test, whereas pupils from some of 
the southern, poorest Italian regions, have an average score between 436 and 450.8 
Our first hypothesis can be accepted. Children of guest-worker immigrants in 
European countries indeed have lower science scores than native pupils in their origin 
countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia). However, 
hypothesis 2 can only be partly confirmed. Although the largest gap in educational 
 13 
performance between immigrant pupils and the native population in their home 
countries has been observed for the children of Italian guest-workers, the children of 
some non-guest-worker groups also show a relatively large gap.  
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Controlling for social background differences between immigrant children and native 
children provides a slightly different result. The negative difference is visible for most 
children from guest-worker origin countries: Croatia (-139; +4), Italy (-54; -57), 
Portugal (-18; -4), Serbia and Montenegro (-39, +12), Spain (-1; +25), and Turkey  
(-23, -33). Italy remains a clear outlier among the guest-worker countries, and the 
substantial negative difference of the Croatian first generation pupils is caused by 
their relatively advantageous social background in comparison to the native Croatian 
pupils. An analogous effect has been observed for the Serbian first generation pupils: 
controlling for social background increases the negative difference from -27 to -39. 
Controlling for social background also increases the negative difference for Turkish 
immigrant pupils, for the first generation from -6 to -23, and for the second generation 
from -9 to -33.  
 In a number of cases, second generation pupils have higher scores than native 
pupils from their origin country, either observed or controlled. This is the case for 
Brazil (observed; +169, controlled; +68), Croatia (-10, +4), the Netherlands (+37, 
+33), Romania (+6, +9), Serbia and Montenegro (-5, +12), Spain (+27, +25), and 
Sweden (+19, +8). These cases show that positive selectivity on the unmeasured 
differences between immigrants and non-immigrants also exists in Europe. But it is 
difficult to assume that emigration from Sweden and the Netherlands also contains a 
positive selectivity dimension, unless one assumes that the strong equality ethos of 
these countries drives the more adventurous Dutch and Swedes into emigration to 
respectively Belgium or Finland and Norway.9 
 Overall, the results lend support for hypothesis 3. Like expected, children of 
guest-worker immigrants have lower science scores than the average pupils in their 
origin countries, even after controlling for parental socio-economic background 
characteristics. However, the gap in performance between children of some non-
guest-worker immigrants and their native population is also large. Moreover, second 
generation immigrant pupils from the guest-worker countries Croatia, Serbia 
Montenegro, and Spain have higher science scores than the natives in their countries 
of origin (in the case of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, this holds only after 
controlling for the socio-economic background of the immigrants and natives).  
Although these findings are insightful, sounder tests of the hypotheses require 
controlling for macro-characteristics of immigrants pupils’ countries of origin and 
destination. Possibly, the relatively low science scores that have been observed for 
immigrant children from many of the guest-worker countries are a mere reflection of 
other country characteristics. In order to account for this possibility, multilevel results 
will be presented in the next paragraph.  
 
Multilevel analysis  
By using individual-level techniques (such as OLS regression) on data with multiple 
levels, standard errors of the macro-level effects will be underestimated, and 
consequently, parameters may unjustly appear to be significant. To analyze non-
hierarchically structured data (origin and destination countries cannot be 
hierarchically ordered), cross-classified multilevel regression analysis is the 
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appropriate technique (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). We 
used Iterative Generalized Least Squares (IGLS) estimation techniques from the 
statistical analysis program MLwiN to estimate models (Browne, 2003). 
In table 2, predictors at the different levels are added stepwise. In model 1, 
only the average science performance of natives in immigrants’ countries of origin 
and destination are included. In model 2, the dummy that indicates whether a child 
originates from a guest-worker country is added. Models 3 and 4 respectively add 
macro-characteristics of countries of origin (economic development, political 
stability, and Islamic religion) and destination (differentiation of the education system 
and the degree of teacher shortage). In model 5, individual level predictors are 
included and model 6 estimates those cross-level interactions, which are possible 
related to the guest-worker origin of immigrant pupils.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Model 1 shows the importance of the average educational performance of the 
natives in the origin countries: its parameter is significant and positive (b=0.96**), 
while the parameter of the educational performance of the natives of the destination 
countries is insignificant. More importantly, this is more or less equal in all six 
models, meaning that the other results can not be explained by the quality of the 
education of the origin and destination countries.  
Model 2 provides another test of hypothesis 2 which stated that the difference 
in science scores between children of guest-worker immigrants and native children in 
their countries of origin is larger than the difference in science scores between 
children of non-guest-worker immigrants and the native children in their countries of 
origin. The significant negative effect of the variable (b=-50.76**) indicates that such 
is indeed the case. Controlled for the average score of natives in their countries of 
origin, immigrant pupils originating from Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the 
former Yugoslavia (the guest-worker countries) perform less in science.   
Model 3 shows that this negative effect of guest-worker origin cannot be 
explained by the economic, political or religious macro-characteristics of the origin 
countries. The negative effect of guest-worker background is hardly affected by the 
inclusion of these macro-characteristics (a reduction from -50.76** to -46.71**). The 
parameter of the variable Islamic country is non-significant, thereby rejecting 
hypothesis 5. So, the difference in science scores between Turkish immigrant pupils 
and average pupils in Turkey is not larger than the difference in science scores 
between the children of Christian guest-worker immigrants and the native pupils from 
their Christian origin countries Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia.  
In model 4, we test whether the characteristics of the educational systems of 
the destination countries are responsible for the negative effect of guest-worker origin. 
Immigrant pupils in destination countries with higher levels of teacher shortages 
perform lower than immigrant children in destination countries with lower levels of 
teacher shortage. Highly differentiated educational systems have no significant effect 
on performance of immigrant children. The degree of teacher shortage and the degree 
of differentiation are not able to explain the negative effect of guest-worker origin 
(b=-42.38**).  Formulated in a more blunt way: the highly differentiated educational 
system of Germany is not the correct explanation of the low educational performance 
of the immigrant children with a guest-worker background in Germany.   
In model 5, we test whether the individual characteristics of the immigrants, 
and especially the less favorable ones of the guest-workers, can explain the negative 
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guest-worker effect. Irrespective of their high predictive power (all individual level 
effects are significant at the 0.05 level), the inclusion of the individual level 
characteristics is unable to fully account for the negative guest-worker effect    
(b=-24.89**). Hypothesis 3 can be accepted. However, the fact that the inclusion of 
the individual characteristics results in a drop of the strength of the guest-worker 
parameter of about 1/2, implies that part of the negative guest-worker effect can be 
explained by the individual characteristics of the guest-worker children (the so called 
‘composition effect’). It is important to note that the difference in educational 
performance between the first and second generation is only modest (b=10.16**). 
This means that there is not a strong improvement in educational performance by the 
second generation, simply because they are born in the destination country.  
In the sixth model, three interaction terms are added. The first term refers to 
the common finding that educational performance is more heavily determined by 
parental background in highly differentiated educational systems. Given that guest-
workers often migrated to countries with highly differentiated educational systems 
(such as Austria, Germany, and Switzerland), the guest-worker origin effect might be 
explained by the negative effect of being a pupil with low educated parents in a highly 
differentiated educational system. The results of model 6 however do not support this 
expectation. This suggests that what might be true for native pupils with lowly 
educated parents is not necessarily true for immigrant pupils with lowly educated 
parents. The reason might be that the cause for the low parental education is 
fundamentally different for natives than for immigrants: the latter had fewer 
possibilities to be educated in their origin country while the former had not enough 
cognitive abilities to reach a higher educational level.  
The second cross-level interaction term that is added to model 6 refers to the 
possibility that the negative effect of guest-worker origin only holds for pupils with 
parents with a poor educational background. This could be a consequence of the 
negative selectivity of guest-workers argument. As can be seen from the table, the 
interaction is indeed significant (b = -6.42**). In combination with the positive main 
effect of parental education (b=9.78**) and the insignificant effect of guest-worker 
origin (b=1.52), this finding implies that the educational performance of immigrant 
pupils with a guest-worker origin hardly increases with their parental education. The 
educational performance of immigrant pupils without a guest-worker origin on the 
other hand normally increases with their parental education. Basically, this result 
indicates that pupils who originate from a guest-worker country and have highly 
educated parents, underperform. Therefore, they are ‘responsible’ for the overall 
negative effect of guest-worker origins. Figure 1 illustrates this finding.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The third cross-level interaction term that is added to model 6 refers to the 
possibility that especially pupils with lower educated parents that originate from an 
Islamic country perform poorly in education. However, the insignificant interaction 
term shows that this is not the case. It signifies that the interaction between guest-
worker origin and parental education can not be explained by the interaction term 
Islamic origin country and parental education. 
In sum, hypothesis 4 (Children of guest-worker immigrants differ more in 
science performance from the pupils in their origin countries than children of non-
guest-worker immigrants, even after controlling for parental socio-economic 
background characteristics of all immigrants, and the macro-characteristics of their 
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origin and destination countries) can be partly confirmed by our multilevel results. 
The negative main effect of guest-worker origin only holds for pupils from highly 
educated parents. That is to say, whereas immigrant pupils who originate from guest-
worker countries and have lower educated parents do not perform less than their 
counterparts from non-guest-worker origins, immigrant pupils who have highly 
educated parents and originate from guest-worker countries ‘underperform’.  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
Our analysis supports the thesis that guest-worker immigrants were negatively 
selected from their native population. That is to say, the average score of children of 
guest-worker immigrants is substantially lower than the science score of comparable 
native pupils in their origin countries Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the former 
Yugoslavia. However, the negative effect of originating from a guest-worker country 
only holds for children of parents with higher educational levels; children from guest-
worker origins who have very low educated parents score as high as comparable 
immigrant children from other origin countries, even if we take into account the 
average performance of native pupils in the origin and destination countries.  
Our analyses have revealed that other country characteristics that affect 
educational performance of immigrants cannot explain the guest-worker effect. 
Neither economic development, political stability, and the dominant Islamic religion10 
of immigrant children’s origin countries nor the degree of differentiation and teacher 
shortage of destination countries’ educational systems can account for the negative 
guest-worker impact. 
 A common explanation for low educational achievement scores of immigrant 
pupils in the USA is the low quality of schools which they attend (Feliciano, 2005). 
The quality of schools within European countries also varies and immigrant pupils 
more often attend schools with a low socio-economic student-composition (Dronkers 
& Levels, 2007).Therefore, immigrant pupils are more hampered from achieving high 
educational scores. However, the quality variation between European schools is 
smaller than that of schools in the USA (Scheerens & Bosker, 1997), as a 
consequence of equal funding of comparable secondary schools by the European 
national states, and the unequal funding of secondary schools by unequal local tax 
revenues in the USA.11  
On the whole, we find more negative selectivity of immigration into Europe 
than positive selection, if we rely on the method of comparison between immigrants 
and their natives in their origin countries. This outcome deviates from the positive 
selectivity of a number of immigrant groups in the USA (Borjas, 1987, 1991; 
Feliciano, 2005). A possible explanation is that immigrants in Europe (irrespective of 
their guest-worker origin) have more difficulties in establishing themselves and their 
children in comparison with immigrants in the traditional immigration countries such 
as the USA. Levels et al. (2008) have shown that immigrant children in traditional 
immigrant receiving countries, in casu Australia and New-Zealand, perform better at 
school. They have mentioned that this better performance can be explained by 
composition effects due to restrictive immigration policies of these two traditional 
immigration countries. However, researchers have also suggested that in traditional 
immigration countries, non-immigrants hold a more favorable view towards 
immigrants’ contribution to the economy (Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmerman 2000). 
With the economic viability of immigrants in mind, national and state level policy 
measures in traditional immigration countries have adopted the educational system in 
such a way that it can cope with the specific educational needs of immigrant children 
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(Iredale and Fox 1997). The lower level of societal openness towards immigrants in 
Europe may explain why immigrant children perform relatively bad in Europe as 
compared to the traditional immigrant receiving countries. As a consequence, most 
immigrants in Europe seem to be more negatively selected. This might however be 
misleading: immigrants in Europe have fewer opportunities in comparison with 
immigrants in traditional immigrant states.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 This section quite elaborately builds on the seminal article of Feliciano (2005) 
2
 Benjamin Franklin, one of the founding fathers of the USA and a famous natural scientist, maintained 
that the Germans immigrating massively to American English colonies in the middle of the 18th century 
were “the most stupid of their own nation”.  
3
 Science performance is the focus of PISA 2006, while reading and math performance are measured 
more superficially. However, if we use reading or math performance instead of science performance as 
the dependent variable, we find substantially the same results. 
4
 The Netherlands could not be taken into account since the immigrant children’s country of origin 
could not be unambiguously determined; in the Dutch case, PISA 2006 only distinguishes between 
immigrants who were born in western countries of origin (the majority of them being German) and 
immigrants who were born in non-western countries (the majority if them being Turkish). Greece and 
Scotland only identified immigrant pupils from origin countries that did not participate in PISA 2006 
(and therefore, the average scores of the natives in those origin countries cannot be established), and 
could therefore also not be taken into account. 
5
 Given that a first generation pupil is born in the country of origin and given that he or she is 15 years 
old when he or she participates in PISA 2006, the parents cannot have migrated to the destination 
country before 1991. If the pupil migrated after age 10 (thus after 2001), it is implausible that he or she 
has a good enough command of the language of the destination country to be allowed to participate in 
PISA. 
6
 If we accept that most children are born before the 40th birthday of their parents and that these 
interviewed children are 15 years old in 2006, 1950 is the earliest birth year of the migrated parents of 
the pupil.  
7
 We exclude all immigrants in the origin countries while computing this average score. 
8
 Again, we find the positive selectivity effect of the restricted possibilities for permanent settlement in 
Switzerland and the strict Swiss policy of sending away unemployed immigrants, which also produce 
positive selectivity of Italian immigrants: the observed science scores of the first and second generation 
Italian immigrant pupils in Switzerland are 476 and 451, versus 416 and 417 in Germany and 453 and 
424 in Luxembourg. The native pupils in Italy have a score of 473.  
9
 However, the migrating Swedes measured by the PISA data have migrated to Finland and Norway, 
which are as equalized societies as Sweden. The Dutch migrants have migrated to Belgium, a step 
which is difficult to characterize as adventurous.  
10
 On can argue with good reasons that the Islam of Turkey is not representative of countries of origin 
where the Islam religion is dominant. The former is more secular and less orthodox than in other 
countries like Bangladesh, Morocco and Pakistan. That might be the explanation for not finding an 
effect of Islamic country in this more restricted analysis with only Turkey, while Heus & Dronkers 
(2008) found in their analysis with all origin countries a clear negative effect of Islamic origin county.   
11
 It is difficult to imagine that the low score of Turkish immigrants in Denmark (374; see table 2A of 
appendix) could be explained by the huge quality discrepancy between Danish secondary schools. 
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Figure 1. The influence of parental education on the scientific performance of 
immigrant children from guest-worker origins and non-guest-worker origins.  
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Source: PISA 2006. 
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Table 1. The average science score of immigrant pupils from 17 different origin 
countries and that of the native pupils in their origin country, both observed and 
controlled for cultural possessions at home, home educational resources, parental 
education, and parental occupation. 
Origin country  Immigrants Native pupils Difference 
 Gen Obs. Contr. Obs. Contr. Obs. Contr. 
Austria 1 449 452 518 517 -59 -63 
 2 492 513   -27 -4 
Belgium 1 557 518 517 518 +40 0 
 2 514 490   -3 -28 
Brazil 1 428 387 385 385 +42 +2 
 2 544 453   +169 +68 
Croatia 1 340 348 496 487 -15 -139 
 2 486 491   -10 +4 
France 1 442 453 500 500 -58 -47 
 2 488 471   -12 -29 
Germany 1 518 503 530 530 -12 -27 
 2 476 481   -54 -49 
Italy 1 416 418 473 472 -57 -54 
 2 410 415   -63 -57 
Netherlands 1 527 533 529 529 -2 +4 
 2 566 562   +37 +33 
Poland 1 471 460 497 498 -20 -38 
 2 500 492   +3 -6 
Portugal 1 448 457 475 475 -27 -18 
 2 472 471   -3 -4 
Rumania 1 425 410 417 417 +8 +7 
 2 423 426   +6 +9 
Russia 1 469 473 478 478 -9 -5 
 2 465 462   -13 -16 
Serbia Montenegro 1 406 394 433 433 -27 -39 
 2 428 445   -5 +12 
Spain 1 465 482 482 483 -17 -1 
 2 509 508   +27 +25 
Sweden 1 495 490 506 506 -9 -16 
 2 525 518   +19 +8 
Switzerland 1 519 520 531 531 -12 -11 
 2 520 517   -11 -14 
Turkey 1 410 395 416 417 -6 -23 
 2 407 384   -9 -33 
Sources: PISA 2006. Natives are those pupils of whom both parents were born in the origin country. 
Immigrants are those pupils of whom at least one parent is born in the origin country. One Unianova 
analysis for control for background per country.
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Table 2: Cross-classified regression of macro-characteristics of origin and destination countries, including guest-workers background and Islamic origin 
country, controlled for individual characteristics, on the scientific literacy of immigrant pupils;  No=17, Nd=11, Ni=5.618 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 461.06** (7.16) 484.02** (7.17) 555.98** (105.46) 550.20** (101.89) 520.20** (90.28) 492.01** (88.19) 
       
Average score natives in origin countries 0.96** (0.11) 0.54** (0.12) 0.77** (0.19) 0.88** (0.19) 0.61** (0.17) 0.57** (0.17) 
Average score natives in destination countries 0.06 (0.38) 0.41 (0.32) 0.33 (0.33) 0.22 (0.33) 0.39 (0.27) 0.38 (0.26) 
       
Origin level variables       
Origin countries with guest worker origin  -50.76** (9.56) -46.71** (9.75) -42.38** (9.81) -24.89** (8.77) 1.52 (10.83) 
Origin countries with guest worker origin * 
    parental education 
     -6.42** (1.65) 
Human Development    -82.79 (121.49) -73.54 (117.12) -139.0 (103.75) -128.26 (101.11) 
Political stability    -8.63 (10.49) -11.53 (10.22) 0.29 (29.07) 1.14 (8.85) 
Islamic country   -3.42 (13.45) -0.67 (13.05) -14.97 (11.54) -16.84 (12.48) 
Islamic country * parental education      -0.001 (1.84) 
       
Destination level variables       
Degree of teacher shortage    -23.78** (10.59) -19.63** (7.76) -18.26** (7.08) 
Highly differentiated education system    -13.23 (14.68) -14.59 (11.24) -17.05 (11.99) 
Highly differentiated education system *    
    parental education 
     1.11 (1.41) 
       
Individual level variables       
Second generation immigrant     10.16** (2.43) 10.39** (2.43) 
Parental education     5.61** (0.73) 9.78** (1.43) 
Parental occupational status     0.99** (0.08) 0.96** (0.08) 
Cultural possessions available at home     9.09** (1.30) 8.89** (1.30) 
Educational resources available at home     8.36** (1.11) 8.38** (1.10) 
Boys     6.52** (2.20) 6.69** (2.20) 
 
      
Variance components       
Destination  287 183 224 154 54 35 
Origin 630 339 298 275 215 204 
Individual 7299 7297 7297 7296 6616 6601 
Deviance (IGLS; -2*LL)  66015.6 65993.3 65991.0 65986.1 65428.3 65412.2 
Source: PISA 2006, own calculations.  
Notes: standard deviations in parentheses; ** = significant at the 0.05 level, * = significant at the 0.1 level
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Appendix (de Heus, Dronkers & Levels, 2008) 
 
Table A1. An overview of the unweighted number of immigrant pupils by origin 
country and destination country.  
 Destination countries 
 
AU AT BE CH DE DK EL FI LI LU LV NL NO NZ PT SC Total 
Origin countries                  
Albania 0 13 0 125 0 0 187 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 326 
Australia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 54 
Austria 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 0 0 107 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 
Bosnia Herzegovina 0 136 0 0 13 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 189 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 45 
Cap Verde 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 
China 252 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 117 4 16 397 
The Congo 0 0 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 137 
Croatia 0 36 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
Czech Republic 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 24 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
France 0 0 125 119 0 0 0 0 2 184 0 0 0 0 0 0 430 
Germany 0 44 147 173 0 0 0 0 16 100 0 90 0 0 0 0 570 
Greece 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Hungary 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
India 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 107 
Italy 0 0 0 300 30 0 0 0 13 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 441 
Rep. of Korea 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 0 0 145 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Macedonia 0 18 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
Morocco 0 0 225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 225 
The Netherlands 0 0 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 
New Zealand 263 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 263 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 42 
The Philippines 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 134 
Poland 0 25 94 0 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 196 
Portugal 0 0 0 241 0 0 0 0 6 799 0 0 0 0 0 0 1046 
Romania 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
Russia 0 0 0 0 79 0 0 25 0 0 186 0 0 0 0 0 290 
Samoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 130 0 0 130 
Serbia Montenegro 0 78 0 952 21 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1065 
Slovakia 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Slovenia 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
South Africa 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 
Spain 0 0 0 119 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 50 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 
Turkey 0 161 156 244 198 81 0 0 11 0 0 505 0 0 0 0 1356 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 0 0 101 
United Kingdom 490 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 0 0 690 
United States 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 
Vietnam 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
Total 1504 575 979 2308 452 146 187 44 150 1350 394 595 63 577 49 41 9414 
Notes: AU=Australia; AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EL=Greece; FI=Finland; 
LI=Liechtenstein; LU=Luxembourg; LV=Latvia; NL=the Netherlands; NO=Norway; NZ=New Zealand; PT=Portugal; SC=Scotland. 
Source: PISA 2006.  
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Table A2 Average scientific literacy of immigrant pupils per destination country and 
origin country (unweighted; N=9.414). 
 
 Destination countries 
 
AU AT BE CH DE DK EL FI LI LU LV NL NO NZ PT SC Mean 
Origin countries                  
Albania 0 412 0 359 0 0 434 0 358 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 404 
Australia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 548 0 0 548 
Austria 0 0 0 495 0 0 0 0 554 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 519 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 476 476 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 504 0 0 0 0 0 504 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 528 0 0 0 0 0 0 528 
Bosnia Herzegovina 0 445 0 0 451 421 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 440 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 464 0 464 
Cap Verde 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 380 0 0 0 0 0 0 380 
China 562 518 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 547 458 483 552 
The Congo 0 0 427 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 427 
Croatia 0 458 0 0 433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 451 
Czech Republic 0 569 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 411 0 0 0 411 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 437 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 437 
France 0 0 448 507 0 0 0 0 446 505 0 0 0 0 0 0 488 
Germany 0 521 508 549 0 0 0 0 550 532 0 504 0 0 0 0 526 
Greece 0 0 0 0 419 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 419 
Hungary 0 561 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 561 
India 551 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 541 551 
Italy 0 0 0 443 415 0 0 0 445 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 438 
Rep. of Korea 514 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 528 0 0 521 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 496 
Macedonia 0 407 0 0 433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 411 
Morocco 0 0 438 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 438 
The Netherlands 0 0 522 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 522 
New Zealand 508 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 508 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 383 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 454 412 
The Philippines 512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 512 
Poland 0 523 439 0 497 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 473 
Portugal 0 0 0 454 0 0 0 0 445 420 0 0 0 0 0 0 428 
Romania 0 439 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 439 
Russia 0 0 0 0 466 0 0 550 0 0 496 0 0 0 0 0 493 
Samoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 425 0 0 425 
Serbia Montenegro 0 426 0 427 414 0 0 0 417 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 467 
Slovakia 0 507 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 507 
Slovenia 0 416 0 0 435 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 420 
South Africa 541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 541 
Spain 0 0 0 466 0 0 0 0 516 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 467 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 522 0 0 0 0 465 0 0 0 477 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 521 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 521 
Turkey 0 380 414 425 411 374 0 0 389 0 0 466 0 0 0 0 429 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 472 0 0 0 0 0 472 
United Kingdom 542 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 569 0 0 550 
United States 571 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 571 
Vietnam 518 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 518 
                  
Mean immigrants 536 437 453 444 438 388 434 522 498 445 492 472 444 525 464 474 468 
Mean natives 524 525 527 527 531 501 480 565 540 512 495 540 492 537 482 516 518 
Difference (I-N) 12 -88 -74 -83 -93 -113 -46 -43 -42 -67 -3 -68 -48 -12 -18 -42 -50 
Notes: AU=Australia; AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EL=Greece; FI=Finland; 
LI=Liechtenstein; LU=Luxembourg; LV=Latvia; NL=the Netherlands; NO=Norway; NZ=New Zealand; PT=Portugal; SC=Scotland. 
Source: PISA 2006.  
 
